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2Abstract:
A fragmented world of competing states is potentially very unstable. As rival states
challenge each other militarily, the outcome will likely generate a very uneven 
distribution of power. For many observers, the political solidarity and economic 
prosperity in the post-second world war world would not have been as great without
United States (US) leadership. The hegemonic project involves using political and 
economic advantages   gained in a world war to restructure the operation of the world 
market and interstate system in the hegemon's own image.
The United States took the lead in opening markets, protecting allies, and promoting the 
stability of the non-communist world. Because of this great accomplishment, many 
people worry about the waning of American global leadership and the seeming 
unwillingness or inability of other states to step into the role.  This research report will 
aim to provide evidence U.S. Hegemony is nothing to fear because since the end of 
World War II (WWII). U.S. hegemony has developed a system of complex 
interdependence that has immensely benefited the core states and the periphery. The 
security community that was fostered under U.S. hegemony will be the major factor in 
reducing the chances of great power war and also increasing the chances of peaceful 
conflict resolution.
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6Chapter I: Introduction
7Background
Since the end of World War Two (WWII) the United States (U.S.) has been 
enabled to maintain its leadership through its allies.  U.S. leadership and hegemony is 
based on mutual consent by its allies: Japan, Germany and Western Europe.  By 
institutional nature of U.S. hegemony the author is referring to how the U.S. leads by 
consensus among its allies and through international organizations and institutions.  
Despite the United States having overwhelming power capabilities in every sphere-
economic, military, and cultural -it does not act unilaterally; a close survey of its history 
will show that multilateralism has been and will continue to be the main facet of its 
foreign policy.  The period under examination is after World War Two to the end of 
George Walker Bush second term.
The legitimacy derived from U.S. hegemony allows the U.S. to remain a super 
power in what could potentially be a multi polar world.  The liberal regime the United 
States help established at the end of World War Two is what ensures and secures its 
primacy.  Institutions like the World Bank and United Nations are regimes that are 
conducive for the allies to forgo harmful competition and foster cooperation.  The U.S.
building institutions that provide its allies with security and as plateaus to foster 
cooperation is what this research report examines.  With Iraq being the first post 9/11 test 
of this theory; it should be kept in mind that the hegemon will occasionally act 
unilaterally but only in rare instances.  Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia is a recent 
8example.  The case of Iraq further illustrates my point because after being in Iraq for five 
years, the Bush administration has seen the futility in unilateralism.  
Research Problem
In this research report I will prove that U.S. leadership is based on consent.  
Despite 9/11 terrorist attack the United States (U.S.), U.S. foreign policy will still be 
rooted in multilaterism. The benevolent regimes it created after WWII, such as the United 
Nations, World Bank Institutions, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, gives the incentive 
for nation states to cooperate. Since the end of World War Two the United States has 
been enabled to maintain its leadership by its allies.  U.S. leadership and hegemony is 
based on mutual consent by its allies.  The legitimacy derived from this allows the U.S. to 
remain a super power in what could potentially be a multi polar world.  Multilateralism 
has always been the major tenet in United States foreign policy.  The unilateral actions 
taken by President George W. Bush are transitory and not the norm after 9/11, such as 
pulling out of the Kyoto Agreement, and invasion of Iraq.  In the last two years, 2006-
2009, the administration back-tracked from its former unilateral stance and Bush 
Doctrine.  It regularly consulted allies, international organizations, and various non 
governmental organizations.  This is bound to continue under the new Barack Obama 
administration that has swiftly committed itself to multilateralism also; the first instance 
of this is returning the permanent representative at the United Nations to the rank of 
cabinet position.  The foreign policy team of Obama are all committed multilateralists
that believe in resolving global conflict through consensus with its allies and not against 
its allies.  The period this research report focuses on is after World War II to George 
Walker Bush presidency.
9U.S. hegemonic order is quite unlike the earlier British hegemonic order that was 
immensely unstable. Since the end of WWII the U.S. has built up a network of complex 
interdependence that will mutually reinforce U.S. hegemonic leadership.  This includes 
building and promoting democratic institutions in countries like Japan, and Germany.  
The U.S. established the Bretton Woods Agreement to ensure free trade and open 
markets, international organizations, like the United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), were seen as the best way of ensuring liberal 
institutionalism. This research report seeks to argue that U.S. leadership provided the 
stability and peace among the western powers WWII. To be sure, its overall material 
capabilities and power position have declined significantly since the early postwar years. 
Notwithstanding this, the proposed study seeks to provide evidence that the political 
institutions and structures of relations that were built under U.S. sponsorship after World 
War II still provide channels and routines of cooperation. America will not (and probably 
cannot) play the leadership role it did a generation ago, but that leadership has been 
reinvented in the form of a dense set of intergovernmental and transnational linkages 
among the major industrial countries and regions of the world.1  These linkages will 
ensure the continuance of American leadership because it benefits the international 
system.  It will also be used to prevent global conflict and ensure peace and prosperity 
despite the events of President George W. Bush’s foreign policy, U.S.  hegemony will 
continue to operate on Wilisonian liberalism.   9/11 will not change the course of U.S. 
foreign policy which is based on multilateralism. This research report will focus on the 
Post 9/11 failure of unilateralism and continuance of multilateralism.
                                                
1Loc cit
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I will test this hypothesis by examining the pre 9/11 structure of the U.S.-led collective 
security system, and also Japan, Germany’s role in supporting and aiding U.S. hegemony 
in the financial and conflict resolution institutional framework.
Research Objectives
The liberal faith in institutions to promote international cooperation and stability, 
suffered a major set-back after the 9/11 Al-Qaeda attack on America which was widely 
perceived to have changed the course of US foreign policy. President George W. Bush, 
for example, declared three months after the attack that “My vision shifted dramatically 
after September 11, because I now realize the stakes, I realize the world has changed”. 
This changed world had two significant manifestations for American foreign policy – a 
quick resort to military actions against Al-Qaeda carried out under the rubric of ‘war on 
terror’, and a disbelief in and gradual drifting away from global institutions to deal with 
global terror. In other words, militarism and unilateralism quickly replaced Wilsonian 
and Clintonian belief in multilateral institutions and became the hallmarks of American 
foreign policy.2
The research will show that the U.S reaction to the 9/11 attacks was the exception 
and not the rule.  Since the beginning of its history, the U.S. has been a firm believer in 
multilaterism.  Drawing on carefully selected cases mentioned elsewhere in this research 
report the study will demonstrate that the world has seen and will continue to see more 
U.S led multilaterism especially with Japan and Germany; as reigning hegemon America 
                                                
2
Nuruzzaman, M. "Liberal Institutionalism and International Cooperation in the Post-9/11 World"
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p179538_index.html 2007-02-28
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will influence through consensus and not unilateralism.  U.S. hegemony is really a 
process of leading through multilateral organizations and institutions with the consent 
and support of major allies (Japan and Germany).
Research Questions
Why did the U.S. set about making liberal institutions after WWII?
Why Germany and Japan will remain steadfast U.S. allies?
Does Unilateralism always fail: Ethiopian invasion of Somalia?
Why does North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement continue?
Hypotheses
U.S. hegemony is nothing to fear because since the end of WWII U.S. hegemony 
has developed a system of complex interdependence that has immensely benefited the 
core states and the periphery to some extent.  The U.S. will resolve global conflicts with 
its major allies and great powers that have interests in the matter.   Liberal 
internationalism will preserve U.S. hegemony because it will solve global conflict 
through consensus.
Theoretical Framework
Both balance of power theory developed by Kenneth Waltz and balance of threat 
theory developed by Stephen Walt are essential for this analysis; the author uses parts of 
both theories to draw a picture of where U.S. economic and foreign policy will be going 
post cold war.  There are two strands of hegemonic leadership; benevolent and coercive.
12
This research report will focus on how they interact with interest and capabilities.  These 
theories help describe situations and cases of where collective action is strengthened and 
not depreciated by a hegemon even one in a declining state.  
Hegemonic stability and Liberal internationalism are the main theories that best 
support and provide evidence for my thesis. The central idea of hegemonic stability 
theory is that the stability of the international system requires a single dominant state to 
articulate and enforce the rules of interaction among the most important members of the 
system.3 For a state to be a hegemon, it must have three attributes: the capability to 
enforce the rules of the system, the will to do so, and a commitment to a system which is 
perceived as mutually beneficial to the major states. A hegemon's capability rests upon 
the likes of a large, growing economy, dominance in a leading technological or economic 
sector, and political power backed up by projective military power. An unstable system 
will result if economic, technological, and other changes erode the international hierarchy 
and undermine the position of the dominant state. Pretenders to hegemonic control will 
emerge if the benefits of the system are viewed as unacceptably unfair.
U.S. hegemonic stability is the foundation for the current international order 
which is based on institutions.  I will briefly examine the British Hegemonic order; and 
compare and contrast it to the much more detailed U.S. hegemonic order, I will like to 
draw a picture of a more stable hegemonic period that will not destabilize via hegemonic 
war, but that will be reinforced by U.S. allies that share a common political, social, and 
                                                
3 Gilpin, Robert, “The Theory of Hegemonic War”, Journal of Interdisciplinary History,  The Origin 
And Prevention of Major Wars, Vol. 18, No. 4,. (Spring, 1988) p. 603
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economic culture.  Global conflicts will be resolved by U.S. leadership in concert with 
allies.
The term 'complex interdependence' was developed by Robert Keohane and 
Joseph Nye and refers to the various, complex transnational connections 
(interdependencies) between states and societies.4 Interdependence theorists noted that 
such relations, particularly economic ones, were increasing; while the use of military 
force and power balancing were decreasing (but remained important). Reflecting on these 
developments, they argued that the decline of military force as a policy tool and the 
increase in economic and other forms of interdependence should increase the probability 
of cooperation among states. The complex interdependence framework can be seen as an 
attempt to synthesize elements of realist and liberal thought. Finally, anticipating 
problems of cheating and relative gains raised by realists, interdependence theorists 
introduced the concept of 'regimes' to mitigate anarchy and facilitate cooperation. Here, 
we can see an obvious connection to neo-liberal institutionalism.
In international relations liberalism covers a fairly broad perspective ranging from 
Wilsonian Idealism through to contemporary neo-liberal theories and the democratic 
peace thesis. Here states are but one actor in world politics, and even states can cooperate 
together through institutional mechanisms and bargaining that undermine the propensity 
                                                
4 Keohan, Robert, O; Nye Jr., Joseph., ‘Globalization: What’s New? What’s Not?’ (And So What?),  
Foreign Policy, No. 118. (Spring 2000) p. 115
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to base interests simply in military terms. States are interdependent and other actors such 
as Transnational Corporations, the IMF and the United Nations play a role.5
Through various international organizations the U.S. promotes free trade, and 
international cooperation; which are important roles for a hegemon.  Liberal 
internationalism is a very important aspect of the U.S. benevolent hegemony.6
Case Study   
This report will focus on the institutional nature of U.S. hegemony and why 
Germany and Japan will not try to compete with a U.S. led world system, but rather will 
stay subordinate and complement it.
PRE World War II to 9/11 Japan and Germany: After WWII the United States 
empowered the moderate and democratic forces with in Germany and Japan and their 
democratic institutions.  To ensure that these forces endured and both countries did not 
return to dictatorship and communism American aid was spent to rebuild their 
economies, and financial regimes were created to mitigate the consequences of free trade 
and the conflict brought on by zero sum economic competition.  Since the end of WWII 
Japan and Germany have been steadfast allies that support U.S. hegemonic stability and 
have never challenged it.
Post 9/11 NATO enlargement: NATO enlargement represents the continual focus 
of bringing countries into the longest democratic military alliance in history.  NATO is 
                                                
5
http://www.irtheory.com/know.htm. (Accessed June 2008) 
6 Kagan, Robert, The Benvelent Empire, Foreign Policy, No. 111 (Summer, 1998), p. 27
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credited for transforming Western Europe into the most peaceful region on earth.  The 
hope is that countries will forgo the need to go to war with each other if they are
members of NATO, and engage in peaceful resolution of conflict.  NATO enhances 
cooperation among member states.
Ethiopian unilateral invasion of Somalia: to reemphasize the failure of unilateralism I will 
refer to Ethiopia’s unilateral invasion of Somalia and the consequences.  The main 
consequence is Ethiopia seeking UN, Africa Union (AU) and IGAD facilitation in 
resolving the security situation in Somalia.
U.S. hegemony and its continuance depend on liberal institutionalism and 
complex interdependence. As America declines in relative economic terms, Japan and 
Germany will take on a more active role in reinforcing and perpetuating American 
hegemony (complex interdependence, liberal intuitionalism). By examining their past and 
current foreign policy behavior we will see that Germany and Japan will be most 
interested in the continuance of U.S. hegemony.   
Methodology
This research report is setting out to show that liberalism and multilateralism is 
the major trend in U.S. foreign policy.  The process tracing approach will be applied here 
to find evidence that a pattern in the cases studied matches the theoretical explanations 
and confirms hypothesized causal connections. By collecting evidence from reputable 
Journals on foreign affairs, Op-eds, editorials written by foreign policy decision makers, 
academics and scholars.  All the sources that were used in this research report are from 
reputable scholars foreign policy decision making. The author will provide evidence to 
16
show the substantive nature of U.S. multilateralism.  The author will also show that the 
world order the U.S. built after WWII is more durable than British order after the 
Napoleonic War. 
This is a qualitative research report that relies on sources from journals and books.  This 
research report will also rely on empirical data such as in journals and books and case 
study research.  The case studies of the various conflict resolution Concerts that all 
include the U.S. having a dominant role will show this.
Literature Review
The following authors are the most recent and pertinent on the subject of 
American leadership.  They have all modified Robert Giplin’s work on U.S. hegemony.  
This research will focus on the institutions and regimes that U.S. leadership has provided 
for the continuance of its leadership role.  It will also highlight the security and peace 
these intuitions have provided.
Mastanduno describes U.S. security policy as "an effort to preserve America's 
position at the top of the international hierarchy" and as a "strategy of preserving 
primacy" or what Melvyn Leffler calls "a preponderance of power. He characterizes the 
current international system as "unipolar" and asserts that "the United States is now in a 
category by itself". American security policy is described as seeking "to preserve the 
United States' dominant position" with its allies and to integrate its Cold War adversaries 
"into a U.S.-centered international order". A more accurate description of the kind of 
behavior predicted by hegemonic stability theory would be hard to find. As Mastanduno 
17
concedes, "the pursuit of primacy induces the United States to be the stabilizer of last 
resort", but is this not a defining expectation of hegemonic stability theory?7
Both, balance of power theory developed by Kenneth Waltz and balance of threat theory 
developed by Stephen Walt; are important theories that the author uses to draw a picture 
of where U.S. economic and foreign policy will be going post cold war.  
The evidence neither fully supports nor fully contradicts either theory. It does reveal a 
striking pattern: U.S. post-Cold War security and economic strategies are each explained 
effectively, but by different realist theories. Balance-of-threat theory accounts for the 
dominant tendency in U.S. security policy: an effort to preserve America's position at the 
top of the international hierarchy by engaging and reassuring other major powers. 
Balance-of-power theory explains the dominant tendency in U.S. foreign economic 
policy: an effort to mobilize for national economic competition against other major 
powers. Since each theory provides a plausible explanation for a central aspect of post-
Cold War U.S. foreign policy, it would be imprudent to follow the advice of realism's 
harshest critics and abandon the core paradigm.8  
For evidence of balance of power behavior the author compares and contrasts U.S.
behavior during the cold war and after.  He uses the break up of Yugoslavia as an 
example. If Yugoslavia was going to break up during the cold war America and the 
Soviet Union vital interests would have been at stake.  America would have supported its 
proxies in that war to the hilt, but since the break up of Yugoslavia happened after the 
                                                
7Sheetz, Mark S.; Mastanduno Michael,  ‘Debating the Unipolar Moment’ in  International Security, Vol.
22, No. 3. (Winter, 1997-1998), p. 169.
8 Mastanduno, Micheal, Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after
the Cold War, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4. (Spring, 1997), p. 51.
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Cold War, America had the initiative to do what it pleased, with out worrying about any 
rival’s counter move.  As the hegemon it could dictate terms and not be subordinate to 
counter moves.  But intervention in Yugoslavia was very slow.   U.S. interventions’ in 
Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti all show similar slow responses.  The author posits that 
American hegemony will not deter its close allies; the bulk of the evidence to this point, 
however, does not support balance of power theory and suggests that a stronger case 
might be made for the opposite of the theory's predictions. Rather than edging away from 
the United States, much less balancing it, Germany and Japan have been determined to
maintain the pattern of engagement that characterized the Cold War. German officials 
continue to view the persistence of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
forward deployment of U.S. forces within NATO as the cornerstone of their national 
security strategy. Japan's official strategy continues to be oriented around maintaining 
and strengthening, for a new era, the U.S.-Japan security treaty. Neither China nor
Russia, despite having some differences with the United States, has sought to organize a 
balancing coalition against it. Indeed, a main security concern for many countries in 
Europe and Asia is not how to distance from an all-too powerful United States, but how 
to prevent the United States from drifting away.9
Balance of threat implies states should act to reduce the threats with other states.  
U.S. hegemony will wane but if the U.S. reassures states of its benevolent intentions; that 
will slow the process considerably.  Balance-of-threat evidence: U.S. security policy 
since the end of the Cold War has conformed, although not completely, to the predictions 
of balance-of-threat theory. U.S. officials have sought to preserve the United States' 
dominant position through efforts to convince the status quo states of Japan and Germany 
                                                
9 lbid p.58.
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to remain partial great powers, and to integrate the undecided states of Russia and China 
into a U.S.-centered international order. U.S. officials have emphasized multilateral
coalitions and decision-making processes, particularly in cases of military intervention.10  
But it is through multilateralism that the U.S. is able to exert its dominant position in the 
world more convincingly.   In security strategy, post-Cold War U.S. behavior has been 
more consistent with the predictions of balance-of-threat theory. In economic strategy, 
however, U.S. behavior has been more consistent with the predictions of balance-of-
power theory.11  During the Cold War the U.S. and its allies were economic nationalist; 
after the Cold War the U.S. with hegemon status has ensured an open market economic 
policy for all.  In foreign economic policy the U.S. has allowed for a liberal market 
economy.
The world is weary of American hegemony, but actually derives great benefit 
from it. The commingled feelings of reliance on and resentment toward America's 
international dominance these days are neither strange nor new. The resentment of power, 
even when it is in the hands of one's friends, is a normal, indeed, timeless human 
emotion-no less so than the arrogance of power. And perhaps only Americans, with their 
rather short memory, could imagine that the current resentment is the unique product of 
the expansion of American dominance in the post-Cold War era. During the 
confrontation with the Soviet Union, now recalled in the United States as a time of
harmony among the Western allies, not just French but also British leaders chafed under 
the leadership of a sometimes overbearing America. As political scientist A.W. DePorte
noted some 20 years ago, the schemes of European unity advanced by French financial 




planner Jean Monnet and French foreign minister Robert Schuman in 1950 aimed "not 
only to strengthen Western Europe in the face of the Russian threat but also-though this
was less talked about-to strengthen it vis-à-vis its indispensable but overpowering 
American ally."12  
The world with out American hegemony will be less prosperous, less democratic, 
and less peaceful.  To prove this point the author contrast the post war Soviet sphere of 
influence with that of the Atlantic alliance; specifically democracy, rule of law, rights 
being constitutionally protected. The uniqueness persisted. During the Cold War, 
America's style of hegemony reflected its democratic form of government as much as
Soviet hegemony reflected Stalin's approach to governance. The "habits of democracy," 
as Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis has noted, made compromise and mutual 
accommodation the norm in U.S.-Allied relations. This approach to international affairs 
was not an example of selfless behavior. The Americans had an instinctive sense, based 
on their own experience growing up in a uniquely open system of democratic capitalism, 
that their power and influence would be enhanced by allowing subordinate allies a great 
measure of internal and even external freedom of maneuver. But in practice, as Gaddis
points out, "Americans so often deferred to the wishes of allies during the early Cold War 
that some historians have seen the Europeans especially the British-as having managed 
them."13  Due to certain liberal social systems developed domestically the American 
hegemony the world came to know after WWII was quite generous and benign.  Even 
after the Cold War ended a large portion of American defense spending is to protect its 
NATO and other allies; like Kuwait ninety percent of the forces involved in liberating 
                                                
12 Kagan, Robert,The Benevolent Empire,  Foreign Policy, No. 111. (Summer, 1998), p. 26.
13 lbid p. 28.
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Kuwait from Iraqi occupation were American forces.  Ever since the United States 
emerged as a great power, the identification of the interests of others with its own has 
been the most striking quality of American foreign and defense policy. Americans seem 
to have internalized and made second nature a conviction held only since World War II: 
Namely, that their own well-being depends fundamentally on the well-being of others; 
that American prosperity cannot occur in the absence of global prosperity; that American 
freedom depends on the survival and spread of freedom elsewhere; that aggression 
anywhere threatens the danger of aggression everywhere; and that American national
security is impossible without a broad measure of international security.14  The author 
uses cases as NATO in Western Europe, Kuwait, and Bosnia as examples of U.S.
benevolence. There are a lot of worries about U.S. hegemony but the reality is that there 
is no replacement for it.  A return to multi polar international system will most definitely 
be less stable and more chaotic, i.e. pre WWI, that’s why with all the griping about 
American Hegemony being overbearing deep down the world prefers the stable 
leadership that America has provided since the end of WWII.
In the Unipolar Illusion by Christopher Layne, the US will try to maintain its 
hegemony by not allowing any regional or global challengers.  What is important is for 
Japan and Germany to remain subordinate partners and not seek to challenge the status 
quo.   This strategy is not overtly aggressive; the use of preventive measures to suppress 
the emergence of new great powers is not contemplated. It is not, in other words, a 
strategy of heavy-handed American dominance. Rather the strategy of preponderance 
seeks to preserve unipolarity by persuading Japan and Germany that they are better off 
remaining within the orbit of an American-led security and economic system than they 
                                                
14 Loc Cit
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would be if they became great powers. The strategy of preponderance assumes that rather 
than balancing against the United States, other states will bandwagon with it. Important 
benefits are thought to flow from the perpetuation of unipolarity. In a unipolar system, it 
is argued, the United States could avoid the unpredictable geopolitical consequences that 
would attend the emergence of new great powers.
Unipolarity would, it is said, minimize the risks of both strategic uncertainty and 
instability. In effect, the strategy of preponderance aims at preserving the Cold War status 
quo, even though the Cold War is over. 15  As evidence the author uses pentagons leaked 
NSC 68 plan which calls for the U.S. to do all in its power to prevent the rise of new 
great powers.  The author’s theoretical framework is neorealism: states do all they can to 
undermine the hegemon.  So the Unipolar moment right now is transitory.  The author’s 
theoretical argument is supported by an extensive historical discussion. A unipolar world 
is not terra incognita. There have been two other comparable unipolar moments in 
modern international history. The evidence from those two eras confirms the expectations 
derived from structural realism: (1)unipolar systems contain the seeds of their own 
demise because the hegemon's unbalanced power creates an environment conducive to 
the emergence of new great powers; and (2) the entry of new great powers into the 
international system erodes the hegemon's relative power and, ultimately, its 
preeminence.16  
Due to differential growth rates; states that are losing power have to contend with 
states that are gaining power.  There are always potential great power emerging and 
trying to curtail there growth maybe futile.  As Gilpin points out, "The critical 
                                                
15 Layne,Christopher , The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise International Security,
Vol. 17, No. 4. (Spring, 1993), p. 7.
16 Loc cit
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significance of the differential growth of power among states is that it alters the cost of 
changing the international system and therefore the incentives for changing the 
international system." Second, Gilpin observes, rising power leads to increasing 
ambition. Rising powers seek to enhance their security by increasing their capabilities 
and their control over the external environment. Third, as Kennedy explains, rising power 
leads also to increased international interests and commitments. Often times for great 
powers, geopolitical and military capabilities are the consequence of a process that begins 
with economic expansion. Economic expansion leads to new overseas obligations (access 
to markets and raw materials, alliances, bases), which then must be defended.  
SAMENESS. Waltz points out, "competition produces a tendency toward sameness of 
the competitors"; that is, toward imitating their rivals' successful characteristic”. Such 
characteristics include not only military strategies, tactics, weaponry, and technology, but 
also administrative and organizational techniques. If others do well in developing 
effective instruments of competition, a state must emulate its rivals or face the 
consequences of falling behind. Fear drives states to duplicate others' successful policies 
because policymakers know that, as Arthur Stein observes, "failure in the anarchic
international system can mean the disappearance of their states."17  
Competition in an anarchic system makes states develop in ways that challenge 
the hegemon’s preponderance.  As evidence the author discusses two periods. France and 
Great Britain’s hegemonic dominance; in both instances there leadership lasted for no 
more than fifty years, when various competitors began to challenge them.  This is why he 
sees U.S. hegemony as transitory. Great Britain and Austria developed into great powers 
as a response to France dominance in the international system.  In the nineteenth century 
                                                
17 lbid p. 15.
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it was Great Britain that was the hegemonic power and Germany the rival catching up at 
an alarming pace, so much so that Great Britain made peace with France and Russia in 
order to protect itself from the German juggernaut that was set on dominating the world, 
and replacing British hegemony.
John G. Ikenberry’s Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony uses
empirical and quantitative data from the end of WWII, the author constructors a picture 
of American hegemony being driven by European insecurities.  This is overall qualitative 
research method.  He uses cases studies of the post war period as evidence of this trend.  
To define American hegemony the author describes British hegemony the pillars that it 
was based on, open markets and freedom of trade.  In its hegemonic decline he states that 
Great Britain could not maintain the open markets, freedom of trade that its hegemony 
depended upon so therefore lost its position as a hegemon and sparked a hegemonic war.  
The author uses the works of Robert Gilpin and Charles Kindleberger to emphasize his 
point of what hegemonic stability looks like.  As evidence he sites British behavior in the 
nineteenth century and American behavior post WWII.  To also high light the differences 
between America and Great Britain the author uses there industrial output indices: The 
unprecedented nature of the American position is reflected in comparisons with British 
economic strength in the nineteenth century. While the British in 1870, at the zenith of 
their power, possessed 32 percent of the global distribution of industrial production, the 
United States held 48 percent of the global share in 1948. The scope of British and 
American power, in their respective eras, is often found to be similar; yet in terms of the 
preponderance of material resources, American power was much greater.18  Although 
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American power was predominate it had to accommodate to its allies; which although 
lacking in great power still had an essential say in creating the new world order: Closer 
historical scrutiny of the period suggests that the absence of success by the United States 
in implementing its liberal designs for order was more pervasive than the hegemonic 
account allows. American officials consistently were forced to modify their plans for a 
liberal, multilateral order; and they often found themselves at a loss in attempting to draw 
others into such a system. In the various commercial negotiations after the war, the 
United States was unable or unwilling to pursue consistent liberal policies. The most 
ambitious efforts at trade liberalization, embodied in the International Trade Organization 
proposal, were blocked by the United States Congress. The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) that did survive was less extensive, contained escape clauses and 
exemptions, and left agriculture trade outside the multilateral framework. In areas such as 
maritime rights and shipping, as Susan Strange notes, the United States also pursued less 
than liberal policies. Moreover, despite the unprecedented power position of the United 
States, holding the dollars and relief funds desperately needed in Britain and on the 
continent, American officials were less than successful in persuading Europe to embrace 
U.S. policies. In a recent study, Michael Mastanduno finds that the United States was 
surprisingly ineffective in convincing Europe to adopt its hard line East-West trade 
strategies.  Moreover, the U.S. was unable to push the European governments toward 
full-scale economic integration, despite its continued efforts and the massive aid of the 
Marshall Plan.19  
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Learning the lesson of World War I (WWI) the U.S.A. was determined to put in a 
place a multilateral system that would avoid the pitfalls of the post WWI economic 
regime.  The problem was that the allies were not strong enough to cope with the 
multilateral economic regimes the U.S. planners had designed for them.  The British 
economic planners put in stiff resistance to most of the plans that the U.S. put forward.
In “British Hegemony and Major Power Wars, 1815-1939: An Empirical Test of 
Giplin’s Model of Hegeomic Goveranance, Edward Speizo examines Robert Gilpin's 
model of "hegemonic governance" which represents one of the few attempts to establish 
explicit theoretical links between hegemony and international politico-military conflict. 
Specifically, Gilpin's analysis suggests that the frequency of international conflict is 
inversely related to the relative power of a hegemon.  Gilpin's model of hegemonic 
governance offers a competing explanation for both the Hundred Years' Peace between 
1815 and 1914 and the "long peace" that has endured since the end of World War II. 
Realists typically account for these periods of relative stability by pointing to the 
existence of a multi polar balance of power in the nineteenth century and a bipolar 
balance in the years since 1945 Gilpin's argument rejects these interpretations by 
identifying hegemony "as the fundamental ordering principle of international relations" 
since the onset of the Industrial Revolution. Hence, the subsequent pattern of major 
power conflict largely can be attributed to the ability of first Britain and later the United 
States to supply the public goods of security and economic order to the international 
system.  Gilpin's perspective on hegemony and international conflict develops within the 
context of a general discussion of "international governance." The argument maintains 
that the international system is not a "spontaneous order" unintentionally formed through 
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the cooperation of functionally undifferentiated political actors. Rather, Gilpin conceives 
of the international system as a succession of "imposed orders" whereby "dominant states 
. . . reign over international affairs . . . [bringing] order and stability to the system"20. 
Historically, four ideal types of international governance have existed: imperial, 
hegemonic, bipolar, and multi polar.21  
Thus the existence and maintenance of free-trade regimes in the mid- 19th and 
mid-20th centuries can be directly attributed to the leadership and burden bearing 
provided by dominant members of the international system, Britain and the United States 
respectively. This argument concerning the provision of a public good by a hegemonic 
actor is fundamental to hegemonic stability theory.  The theory entails two significant yet 
separable conclusions. First, the presence of a dominant actor will lead to the provision of 
a stable international regime of free trade (more broadly, hegemons provide leadership 
for the emergence of international regimes in various issue-areas). Second, although the 
dominant leader benefits from this situation (i.e., it turns a net "profit" from providing the 
good), smaller states gain even more. They bear none of the costs of provision and yet 
share fully in the benefits. In Olson's terms the "small exploit the large” and the 
traditional view of hegemony in the international system is turned on its head22. 
In other circumstances, when power is distributed asymmetrically but hegemony 
is exercised in ways that do not benefit all states, subordinate states will chafe under the 
(coercive) leadership. One obvious empirical implication is that in the former case 
smaller powers will continue to support a declining hegemonic leader; in the latter case 
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they will work to hasten its demise.  This illustrates how the theory may ultimately 
generate a rich set of empirical propositions-although it must do so as part of a rigorous 
elaboration of the theory.  Hegemonic decline weakens both sources of power and 
strengthens the possibility of collective action by forcing states to cooperate if they wish 
to achieve reasonable out comes. However, this observation needs to be balanced by the 
insight of the previous section that too precipitous a decline in the size of the hegemonic 
actor and other large states may increase the size of the requisite k-group and impede 
collective action.23  The political solidarity and economic prosperity in the postwar 
Western world would not have been as great without American leadership. The United 
States took the lead in opening markets, protecting allies, and promoting the stability of 
the noncommunist world. Because of this great accomplishment, many people worry 
about the waning of American global leadership and the seeming unwillingness or 
inability of other states to step into the role.24  
The literature on hegemony can be divided into two schools, systemic and realist, 
each containing two prominent theories; the two variants of the systemic approach are 
world economy theory and long cycle theory the realist variants are hegemonic stability 
theory, Gilpin, and power transition theory.  In systemic theories, the unit of analysis is 
the world system as a whole, while in realist theories it is the nation-state. Systemic 
analyses focus on the effects of global structures and dynamics that result from the world 
capitalist and international political systems. Realist approaches concentrate on political 
relations among states, from which emerge the international political system and regimes. 
While realist analysis compares national economies, he often ignores the structure and 
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dynamics of the world economy. Thompson describes the effects of hegemony on major 
wars for the period of 1500 to 1986 and suggests that all theories converge on the 
following thesis: periods when economic and or military power is concentrated in a 
single hegemon are associated with peace, while periods of dispersed power are 
associated with war. Yet most of his and other empirical evidence has been relatively 
descriptive. The negative association of hegemony with major wars is frequently asserted 
in world-system studies, along with calls for further empirical research of the issues. 
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Chapter II: The Institutional Nature of U.S. Hegemony: 
Why Japan and Germany Support U.S. Leadership
31
By examining the Japanese and German alliance under U.S. hegemony I will 
draw a picture of common trends and not so common outcomes.  In the current 
international system, the United States is in the enviable position of not facing any state, 
or coalition of states, that combines great power capability with clear intent to destabilize 
the existing order. Instead, the United States faces two potential great powers whose 
international situation and foreign policy behavior suggest a preference for the status quo, 
Japan and Germany, and two others who sit on the fence, China and Russia, with foreign 
policy intentions and aspirations more uncertain.  Perhaps the most important way in 
which the United States used its overwhelming power capabilities after World War II was 
in its occupation and reconstruction policies in Germany and Japan.
At the height of its hegemony after World War II, the United States used its 
immense capabilities to restructure these two just defeated enemies. Japan and Germany 
the two economic giants apart from the U.S. provide the critical mass that helps to 
perpetuate U.S. hegemony. Japan depends on other nations for nearly all of its natural 
resources, particularly energy: Japan imports its oil from Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, 
United Arab, Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Angola, Libya, Nigeria, Ecuador, 
Venezuela, Indonesia, making it reluctant to involve itself in controversial issues for fear 
of angering suppliers and being cut off from needed goods. Indeed, Japan's dependence 
on external resources fundamentally prohibits it from being hegemonic in the political 
realm. A good example of Japan's shying away from politics became evident after the 
1973 oil crisis, when Tokyo made a concerted effort to curry the friendship of all nations, 
particularly those with resources vital to Japan. It did this by giving development loans 
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and grants to these countries and technical assistance through various non-governmental 
organizations.  In terms of human rights issues in the United Nations, prior to 1982 Japan 
refused to take an active part in human rights activities as it did not consider it 
advantageous to expose itself to unnecessary position-taking. Recently, Japan has 
continued to remove itself from highly politicized issues.  Japan constitution prevents it 
from taking a more assertive role, so it will do its best to prop up American hegemony; 
Japan foreign policy decision makers believe that the pacifist clauses in the constitution 
should remain and that Japan’s security is best provided for by the United States security 
umbrella.  As mentioned previously, Japan's Constitution, as well as its experience in 
World War II, make it reluctant to do more than assume a defensive military posture. It 
spends just over one percent of its GNP on defense, with approximately $2.5 billion 
going to facilities used by U.S. servicemen stationed in Japan as well as for local 
personnel. Hiroko Yamane notes that the Japanese public is quite satisfied with economic 
prosperity and supports the antiwar clause of the Constitution. 
Consequently, Yamane argues, the Japanese do not want the government to 
increase its defense spending or to get more involved in international politics. This 
sentiment places a fundamental barrier to Japanese hegemony in the military realm. Japan 
is playing a much larger role than previously in aiding developing nations, but the case 
studies of China and India reveal that Japan's willingness to increase its role does not 
extend substantially beyond its own interests for economic gain. Additionally, China and 
India both are reluctant to allow Japan to play a significantly greater role in their 
countries -China, because of past memories of Japanese dominance and the Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP) desire to retain control over the Chinese economy, and India, 
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because of a firm commitment to independent development. Japanese potential in the 
cultural realm is also extremely limited, not merely by the strong cultural traditions of 
nations such as India and China, but also by Japan's intrinsic motivation -it does not 
desire cultural hegemony. Japan has been reluctant to export its culture en masse, and 
especially reluctant to foster any kind of Asian brotherhood. As was the case in the late 
nineteenth century, it often seems that Japan tries to distance itself from the rest of Asia, 
seeing itself as superior to its neighbors. Thus, even if Japanese culture begins to crop up 
with increased economic and commercial relations between Japan and other nations, 
Japan is unlikely to see the kind of success that Britain and the U.S. had in propagating 
their cultures throughout the globe, rendering Japanese cultural hegemony an 
impossibility. Externally, Japanese expansion and dominance is also limited by the rise of 
regional powers, particularly China and India. Japan is a newcomer to global politics, 
whereas China and India have been involved since the 1950s. Thus, neither China nor 
India is willing to consent to Japanese hegemony.25  
Japanese potential for hegemonic dominance is limited both by internal 
shortcomings and external factors.  This is why Japan will facilitate America’s 
hegemonic role, because it cannot provide an alternative. Conscious of this internal 
psychological dilemma, yet faced with external pressures not to use Japan's growing 
financial resources "egotistically," Japanese leaders are in the process of forging a new 
conception of Japan's responsibilities as an international and regional power. The blue 
book, Japan’s strategic defense assessment, urges the Japanese people to participate in 
shaping Japan's growing role in the international community, as well as reaping the 
                                                
25 Ventura, Patricia. “CULTURAL LOGIC OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE GLOBALIZATION 
ERA”, http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/UFE0000816/ventura_p.pdf   ( May 14, 2008) p. 78
34
benefits of such a position. It further stresses the aims of "peace, stability and prosperity," 
first and foremost through Japan's membership in the "western democracies."26 Japan is
fully integrated into the American hegemonic system and stands to lose if this system is 
altered fundamentally therefore it will support U.S. led international system. The concept 
of U.S.-Japanese multilateralism is based on the doctrine of "Pacific Basin Cooperation," 
which was born in the context of the rising U.S. trade deficit vis-a-vis Japan in the late 
1970s, and was expressed in the Carter-Ohira Joint Declaration of May 2, 1979.27
Provisions were made then for U.S. to reintegrate Japan---an ally if indeed an economic 
rival- into its political and military strategy, which would be under U.S. hegemony. In 
other words, Japan would be expected to increase its contribution to the security of the 
region by playing the "non-military" role of cooperating with Asia-Pacific nations in 
economic development and educational, scientific, and technological exchange.
This economic-based approach to the well-being of the Asia-Pacific region, 
termed "comprehensive security," was what allowed Japan to make its presence 
increasingly accepted in the region without becoming involved in military or political 
issues. Peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region depend essentially on finding 
political solutions to complex problems. In turn, finding political solutions for areas of 
high tension in Asia-particularly in Indochina, the Korean peninsula, and potentially even 
Taiwan--depend largely on two elements, the status of Sino-Russian relations and the 
status of US.-Russian relations, both areas in which Japanese leaders assert that they have 
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no political leverage.28 In the past, the postwar leaders of Japan have used their 
comparatively apolitical position as a means of fostering the economic expansion of the 
country. Even today Japan continues to hide behind its defeat in World War II as a 
rationale for pursuing its own and somewhat isolated economic ends. Attempts to 
appease both the United States and Japan's Asian neighbors, often through public self-
effacement, would seem a continuation of this policy, which is based on passivity and 
allows little opportunity for the political maturation of the Japanese people.
Above all, it is ultimately Japan itself that will be the victim of such a policy. 
Japan's foreign policy strategy, which is based upon adopting a relatively submissive 
posture due as much to the importance of the U.S. market as to widespread domestic 
satisfaction with the politico-economic status quo, has begun to cause some Japanese 
skeptics29 to wonder just how long the Japanese can hide their national pride.  In the final 
analysis, the shape of Japan's future role as a dominant power in the Asia-Pacific region 
is a matter than can only depend on domestic Japanese political sentiment. In any case, it 
is clear that the danger of Japan sliding into the role of a regional military power backed 
by ultranationalists who have been disappointed by Japan's piecemeal, apologetic policies 
is real. For the time being, political and intellectual debate slumbers on in Japan, 
overwhelmed by the thrill of prosperity. For the growing number of Japanese who are 
able to find channels of expression whether they are personal, cultural, or political--only 
by way of money, the consequences could be unhappy and dangerous if ultranationalist 
have their way and have Japan play a more aggressive role in the region.30
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Perhaps the most important way in which the United States used its overwhelming 
power capabilities after World War II was in its occupation and reconstruction policies in 
Germany and Japan. It was acting on a lesson learned from the disastrous 1919 postwar 
settlement within Germany-that it was dangerous to leave in place the defeated and 
humiliated military and political elites that had fought and lost the war. In a less direct 
way, the United States was also acting on an argument made by Woodrow Wilson and 
other liberals during the earlier world war- that democratic and liberal capitalist states 
pose fewer threats to each other, and that they are more likely to cooperate together in a 
peaceful political order. In effect, the most consequential act of American hegemony after 
1945 was to reorient the "social purpose" of the other major states. From the perspective 
of fifty years later, it was the political reorientation of Germany and Japan (and to a lesser 
extent the other Western industrial states) that mattered most. The transformation of the 
social purpose of these states -how these states define and express the purpose and goals 
of politics and society -seems to have most altered the course of Western history. It was 
the transformation of "aims" more than the management of "arms" that most shaped our 
recent past. But this brings us to the last issue. If the social purpose of the leading states 
has been transformed, perhaps the world does not need hegemonic leadership in the way 
it did in the past. In the 1940s, the great powers of the world were a heterogeneous 
complex of authoritarian, socialist, autocratic, and liberal democratic states. 
Today, there is still a mix, but it is ultimately a much more homogeneous complex 
of states. Perhaps America's liberal hegemonic work has largely been accomplished at 
least the work that requires the most concentrated use of material capabilities and military 
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power.31 Rather, we should ask whether, when predominance in the power base declines, 
the basic regime (the network of rules, norms, etc.) weakens or the ability of the 
preponderant state to determine rules lessens.32 The United States was the world's 
foremost military power, and only it had the nuclear "winning weapon." While U.S. 
preponderance was not so overwhelming as to enable it to set all the rules for the entire 
world system, it did permit it to establish the basic principles for the new economic order 
in the over 80 percent of the world economy controlled by capitalist states and to 
organize a system of collective security to maintain political and economic control over 
that 80 percent.33
A final major gain to the United States from the Pax Americana has perhaps been 
less widely appreciated. It nevertheless proved of great significance in the short as well as 
in the long term: the pervasive cultural influence of the United States. This dimension of 
power base is often neglected. After World War II the authoritarian political cultures of 
Europe and Japan were utterly discredited, and the liberal democratic elements of those 
cultures revivified. The revival was most extensive and deliberate in the occupied powers 
of the Axis, where it was nurtured by drafting democratic constitutions, building 
democratic institutions, curbing the power of industrial trusts by decartelization and the 
rebuilding of trade unions, and imprisoning or discrediting much of the wartime 
leadership; post war reconstruction of Germany and Japan exhibit all these features.  
Moderates were giving a great voice in the way government business was done.  
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Constitutions in these countries were changed and amended to ensure democratic 
practices and martial elites were prosecuted. American liberal ideas largely filled the 
cultural void. The effect was not so dramatic in the "victor" states whose regimes were 
reaffirmed (Britain, the Low and Scandinavian countries), but even there the United 
States and its culture was widely admired. The upper classes may often have thought it 
too "commercial," but in many respects American mass consumption culture was the 
most pervasive part of America's impact. American styles, tastes, and middle-class
consumption patterns were widely imitated, in a process that' has come to bear the label 
"coca-colonization."34
After WWII the U.S. established organizations such as the United Nations, NATO 
and others.  In each these new regimes it make Germany a member and eventual an
integral partner.  Germany's freedom of movement has been limited by domestic 
institutional constraints overlain by a dense network of external institutional constraints 
on autonomous decision making in the domains of security and economy. Thus a 
powerful combination of constitutional design, membership in integrative international 
institutions and the continued division of Germany achieved the post-war American 
objective of 'security for Germany and security from Germany'.35  Others are even more 
sanguine about the prospect of an active German hegemony. One body of literature, such 
as Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson, 'Germany in the European Union: Gentle 
Giant or Emergent Leader?' International Affairs, 72 (1996), 9-32., focuses upon the 
constraining effects of Germany's 'exaggerated multilateralism' or a reliance upon 
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'indirect institutional power'." The institutionalization of German power has produced an 
empowered but non-threatening Germany that sets the European agenda and dominates
the institutional evolution of the European Union (EU) and its governance structures.36
The cornerstone of German security policy is the perpetuation of NATO, including the 
maintenance of U.S. forces in Europe and the U.S. nuclear guarantee. In 1994 German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl described the U.S. presence as an "irreplaceable basis for 
keeping Europe on a stable footing," and that sentiment is echoed routinely by high 
German officials. German participation in the Western European Union and the 
Eurocorps has been based on the presumption that European military forces must be 
integrated into NATO rather than standing as autonomous units.37
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Chapter III: The Nature of U.S. Hegemony Post Second 
World War
41
The Nature of U.S. Hegemony Post Second World War:
For industrial societies, the Second World War destroyed more wealth than it 
created because it disrupted the global trade on which wealth had come to depend.  No 
longer could states gain in wealth by seizing territory and resources from each other as 
they had done during the mercantilist period in the seventeenth and eighteenth century.  
WWII broke the world power of the Western European states.  Even without the advent 
of nuclear weapons, it drove home the lesson of the First World War that the major 
European states could no longer wage war amongst themselves without bringing about 
the political and physical impoverishment of their societies, and perhaps destroying them 
completely. 
By 1945 it was clear that all out war had become an irrational instrument in 
relations among major powers.  Almost no conceivable national objective short of last-
ditch survival justified the costs of undertaking it.  This lesson was as manifestly true for 
revolutionary workers’ states like the Soviet Union as it was for conservative, bourgeois, 
capitalist states like Britain and France.38
A final major gain to the United States from the benevolent hegemony has 
perhaps been less widely appreciated. It nevertheless proved of great significance in the 
short as well as in the long term: the pervasive cultural influence of the United States.39
This dimension of power base is often neglected. After World War II the authoritarian 
political cultures of Europe and Japan were utterly discredited, and the liberal democratic 
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elements of those cultures revivified. The revival was most extensive and deliberate in 
the occupied powers of the Axis, where it was nurtured by drafting democratic 
constitutions, building democratic institutions, curbing the power of industrial trusts by 
decartelization and the rebuilding of trade unions, and imprisoning or discrediting much 
of the wartime leadership. American liberal ideas largely filled the cultural void. The 
effect was not so dramatic in the "victor" states whose regimes were reaffirmed (Britain, 
the Low and Scandinavian countries), but even there the United States and its culture was 
widely admired. The upper classes may often have thought it too "commercial," but in 
many respects American mass consumption culture was the most pervasive part of 
America's impact. American styles, tastes, and middle-class consumption patterns were 
widely imitated, in a process that' has come to bear the label "coca-colonization."40  After 
WWII policy makers in the USA set about remaking a world to facilitate peace. The 
hegemonic project involves using political and economic advantages gained in world war 
to restructure the operation of the world market and interstate system in the hegemon's 
own image. The interests of the leader are projected on a universal plane: What is good 
for the hegemon is good for the world. The hegemonic state is successful to the degree 
that other states emulate it. Emulation is the basis of the consent that lies at the heart of 
the hegemonic project.41
Since wealth depended on peace the U.S set about creating institutions and 
regimes that promoted free trade, and peaceful conflict resolution.  U.S. benevolent 
hegemony is what has kept the peace since the end of WWII. The upshot is that U.S. 
hegemony and liberalism have produced the most stable and durable political order that 
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the world has seen since the fall of the Roman Empire. It is not as formally or highly 
integrated as the European Union, but it is just as profound and robust as a political order, 
Kant’s Perpetual Peace requires that the system be diverse and not monolithic because 
then tyranny will be the outcome. As long as the system allows for democratic states to 
press claims and resolve conflicts, the system will perpetuate itself peacefully.  A state 
such as the United States that has achieved international primacy has every reason to 
attempt to maintain that primacy through peaceful means so as to preclude the need of 
having to fight a war to maintain it.42  This view of the post-hegemonic Western world 
does not put a great deal of emphasis on U.S. leadership in the traditional sense. U.S. 
leadership takes the form of providing the venues and mechanisms for articulating 
demands and resolving disputes not unlike the character of politics within domestic 
pluralistic systems.43  
America as a big and powerful state has an incentive to organize and manage a 
political order that is considered legitimate by the other states. It is not in a hegemonic 
leader's interest to preside over a global order that requires constant use of material 
capabilities to get other states to go along. Legitimacy exists when political order is 
based on reciprocal consent. It emerges when secondary states buy into rules and norms 
of the political order as a matter of principle, and not simply because they are forced into 
it. But if a hegemonic power wants to encourage the emergence of a legitimate political 
order, it must articulate principles and norms, and engage in negotiations and 
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compromises that have very little to do with the exercise of power.44 So should this 
hegemonic power be called leadership, or domination? Well, it would tend toward the 
latter. Hierarchy has not gone away from this system. Core states have peripheral areas: 
colonial empires and neo-colonial backyards. 
Hegemony, in other words, involves a structure in which there is a hegemonic 
core power. The problem with calling this hegemonic power "leadership" is that 
leadership is a wonderful thing-everyone needs leadership. But sometimes I have notice 
that leadership is also an ideology that legitimates domination and exploitation. In fact, 
this is often the case. But this is a different kind of domination than in earlier systems. Its 
difference can be seen in a related question: is it progressive? Is it evolutionary in the 
sense of being better for most people in the system? I think it actually is a little bit better. 
The trickle down effect is bigger-it is not very big, but it is bigger.45  It is to this theory, 
Hegemonic Stability that the glass slipper properly belongs, because both U.S. security 
and economic strategies fit the expectations of hegemonic stability theory more 
comfortably than they do other realist theories.  We must first discuss the three pillars 
that U.S. hegemony rests on structural, institutional, and situational. (1) Structural 
leadership refers to the underlying distribution of material capabilities that gives some 
states the ability to direct the overall shape of world political order. Natural resources, 
capital, technology, military force, and economic size are the characteristics that shape 
state power, which in turn determine the capacities for leadership and hegemony.  If 
leadership is rooted in the distribution of power, there is reason to worry about the 
present and future. The relative decline of the United States has not been matched by the 
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rise of another hegemonic leader. At its hegemonic zenith after World War II, the United 
States commanded roughly forty five percent of world production. It had a remarkable 
array of natural resource, financial, agricultural, industrial, and technological assets. 
America in 1945 or 1950 was not just hegemonic because it had a big economy or a huge 
military; it had an unusually wide range of resources and capabilities. This situation may 
never occur again. As far as one looks into the next century, it is impossible to see the 
emergence of a country with a similarly commanding power position. (2) Institutional 
leadership refers to the rules and practices that states agree to that set in place principles 
and procedures that guide their relations. It is not power capabilities as such or the 
interventions of specific states that facilitate concerted action, but the rules and mutual 
expectations that are established as institutions.  Institutions are, in a sense, self-imposed 
constraints that states create to assure continuity in their relations and to facilitate the 
realization of mutual interests.  A common theme of recent discussions of the 
management of the world economy is that institutions will need to play a greater role in 
the future in providing leadership in the absence of American hegemony. Bergsten 
argues, for example, that "institutions themselves will need to play a much more 
important role.46
Institutional management is important and can generate results that are 
internationally greater than the sum of their national parts. The argument is not that 
international institutions impose outcomes on states, but that institutions shape and 
constrain how states conceive and pursue their interests and policy goals. They provide
channels and mechanisms to reach agreements. They set standards and mutual 
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expectations concerning how states should act. They "bias" politics in internationalist 
directions just as, presumably, American hegemonic leadership does. (3) Situational 
leadership refers to the actions and initiatives of states that induce cooperation quite apart 
from the distribution of power or the array of institutions. It is more cleverness or the 
ability to see specific opportunities to build or reorient international political order, rather 
than the power capacities of the state, that makes a difference. In this sense, leadership 
really is expressed in a specific individual-in a president or foreign minister-as he or she 
sees a new opening, a previously unidentified passage forward, a new way to define state 
interests, and thereby transforms existing relations. Hegemonic stability theorists argue 
that international politics is characterized by a succession of hegemonies in which a 
single powerful state dominates the system as a result of its victory in the last hegemonic 
war.47  
Especially after the cold war America can be described as trying to keep its 
position at the top but also integrating others more thoroughly in the international 
system that it dominates. It is assumed that the differential growth of power in a state 
system would undermine the status quo and lead to hegemonic war between declining 
and rising powers48, but I see a different pattern: the U.S. hegemonic stability promoting 
liberal institutionalism, the events following 9/11 are a brief abnormality from this path, 
but the general trend will be toward institutional liberalism. Hegemonic states are the 
crucial components in military alliances that turn back the major threats to mutual 
sovereignties and hence political domination of the system. Instead of being territorially 
                                                
47Loc cit
48
Gilpin, Robert, ‘The Theory of Hegemonic War’ in Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4
p. 596.
48
Chase-Dunn Christopher; et. al., Op. Cit. p. 363.
47
aggressive and eliminating other states, hegemons respect other's territory. They aspire to 
be leaders and hence are upholders of inter-stateness and inter-territoriality.49  The nature 
of the institutions themselves must, however, be examined. They were shaped in the 
years immediately after World War II by the United States. The American willingness to 
establish institutions, the World Bank to deal with finance and trade, United Nations to 
resolve global conflict, NATO to provide security for Western Europe, is explained in 
terms of the theory of collective goods. It is commonplace in the regimes literature that 
the United States, in so doing, was providing not only private goods for its own benefit 
but also (and perhaps especially) collective goods desired by, and for the benefit of, other 
capitalist states and members of the international system in general. (Particular care is 
needed here about equating state interest with "national" interest.) Not only was the 
United States protecting its own territory and commercial enterprises, it was providing 
military protection for some fifty allies and almost as many neutrals. Not only was it 
ensuring a liberal, open, near-global economy for its own prosperity, it was providing the 
basis for the prosperity of all capitalist states and even for some states organized on non-
capitalist principles (those willing to abide by the basic rules established to govern 
international trade and finance). While such behaviour was not exactly selfless or 
altruistic, certainly the benefits-however distributed by class, state, or region-did accrue 
to many others, not just to Americans.50  For the truth about U.S. dominant role in the 
world is known to most clear-eyed international observers. And the truth is that the 
benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the 
world's population. It is certainly a better international arrangement than all realistic 
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alternatives. To undermine it would cost many others around the world far more than it 
would cost Americans-and far sooner. As Samuel Huntington wrote five years ago, 
before he joined the plethora of scholars disturbed by the "arrogance" of American 
hegemony; "A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and 
disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United 
States continues to have more influence than any other country shaping global 
affairs”.51
I argue that the overall American-shaped system is still in place. It is this macro 
political system-a legacy of American power and its liberal polity that remains and serves 
to foster agreement and consensus. This is precisely what people want when they look for 
U.S. leadership and hegemony.52  If the U.S. retreats from its hegemonic role, who would 
supplant it, not Europe, not China, not the Muslim world –and certainly not the United 
Nations. Unfortunately, the alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral utopia, 
but the anarchic nightmare of a New Dark Age. Moreover, the alternative to unipolarity 
would not be multipolarity at all. It would be ‘apolarity’ –a global vacuum of power.53  
Since the end of WWII the United States has been the clear and dominant leader
politically, economically and military.  But its leadership as been unique; it has not been 
tyrannical, its leadership and hegemony has focused on relative gains and has forgone 
absolute gains.  The difference lies in the exercise of power. The strength acquired by the 
United States in the aftermath of World War II was far greater than any single nation had 
ever possessed, at least since the Roman Empire. America's share of the world economy, 
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the overwhelming superiority of its military capacity-augmented for a time by a 
monopoly of nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them--gave it the choice of 
pursuing any number of global ambitions. That the American people "might have set the 
crown of world empire on their brows," as one British statesman put it in 1951, but chose 
not to, was a decision of singular importance in world history and recognized as such.54  
Leadership is really an elegant word for power. To exercise leadership is to get others to 
do things that they would not otherwise do. It involves the ability to shape, directly or
indirectly, the interests or actions of others. Leadership may involve the ability to not just 
"twist arms" but also to get other states to conceive of their interests and policy goals in 
new ways. This suggests a second element of leadership, which involves not just the 
marshalling of power capabilities and material resources. It also involves the ability to 
project a set of political ideas or principles about the proper or effective ordering of 
po1itics. It suggests the ability to produce concerted or collaborative actions by several 
states or other actors. Leadership is the use of power to orchestrate the actions of a group 
toward a collective end.55  
By validating regimes and norms of international behaviour the U.S. has given 
incentives for actors, small and large, in the international arena to behave peacefully.  
The uni-polar U.S. dominated order has led to a stable international system.  Woodrow 
Wilson’s zoo of managed relations among states as supposed to his jungle method of 
constant conflict.  The U.S. through various international treaties and organizations as 
become a quasi world government; It resolves the problem of provision by imposing 
itself as a centralized authority able to extract the equivalent of taxes. The focus of the 
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theory thus shifts from the ability to provide a public good to the ability to coerce other 
states.  A benign hegemon in this sense coercion should be understood as benign and not 
tyrannical.  If significant continuity in the ability of the United States to get what it wants 
is accepted, then it must be explained. The explanation starts with our noting that the 
institutions for political and economic cooperation have themselves been maintained. 
Keohane rightly stresses the role of institutions as "arrangements permitting 
communication and therefore facilitating the exchange of information.  By providing 
reliable information and reducing the costs of transactions, institutions can permit 
cooperation to continue even after a hegemon's influence has eroded. Institutions provide 
opportunities for commitment and for observing whether others keep their commitments. 
Such opportunities are virtually essential to cooperation in non-zero-sum 
situations, as gaming experiments demonstrate. Declining hegemony and stagnant (but 
not decaying) institutions may therefore be consistent with a stable provision of desired 
outcomes, although the ability to promote new levels of cooperation to deal with new 
problems (e.g., energy supplies, environmental protection) is more problematic. 
Institutions nevertheless provide a part of the necessary explanation.56
In restructuring the world after WWII it was America that was the prime 
motivator in creating and supporting the various international organizations in the 
economic and conflict resolution field. An example of this is NATO’s making Western 
Europe secure for the unification of Europe.  It was through NATO institutionalism that 
the countries in Europe where able to start the unification process.  The U.S. working 
through NATO provided the security and impetus for a conflict prone region to unite and 
benefit from greater cooperation. Since the United States emerged as a great power, the 
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identification of the interests of others with its own has been the most striking quality of 
American foreign and defence policy. Americans seem to have internalized and made 
second nature a conviction held only since World War II: Namely, that their own well-
being depends fundamentally on the well-being of others; that American prosperity 
cannot occur in the absence of global prosperity; that American freedom depends on 
the survival and spread of freedom elsewhere; that aggression anywhere threatens the 
danger of aggression everywhere; and that American national security is impossible 
without a broad measure of international security.57
I see a multi-polar world as one being filled with instability and higher chances of 
great power conflict.  The Great Power jostling and British hegemonic decline that led to 
WWI is an example of how multi polar systems are prone to great power wars.  I further 
posit that U.S. hegemony is significantly different from the past British hegemony 
because of its reliance on consent and its mutilaterist nature.  The most significant would 
be the UN and its various branches financial, developmental, and conflict resolution.  It is 
common for the international system to go through cataclysmic changes with the fall of a 
great power.  I feel that American hegemony is so different especially with its reliance on 
liberal institutionalism and complex interdependence that U.S. hegemonic order and 
governance will be maintained by others, if states vary in size, then cooperation between 
the largest of the former free riders (and including the declining hegemonic power) may 
suffice to preserve the cooperative outcome. Thus we need to amend the assumption that 
collective action is impossible and incorporate it into a fuller specification of the 
circumstances under which international cooperation can be preserved even as a 
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hegemonic power declines.58 If hegemony means the ability to foster cooperation and 
commonalty of social purpose among states, U.S. leadership and its institutional creations 
will long outlast the decline of its post war position of military and economic dominance; 
and it will outlast the foreign policy stumbling of particular administrations.59 U.S.
hegemony will continue providing the public good that the world is associated with 
despite the rise of other powers in the system “cooperation may persist after hegemonic 
decline because of the inertia of existing regimes. Institutional factors and different logics 
of regime creation and maintenance have been invoked to explain the failure of the 
current economic regime to disintegrate rapidly in response to the decline of American 
predominance in world affairs.”60
Since the end of WWII the majority of the states that are represented in the core 
have come to depend on the security that U.S. hegemony has provided, so although they 
have their own national interest, they forgo short term gains to maintain U.S. hegemony. 
Why would other states forgo a leadership role to a foreign hegemon because it is in their 
interests; one particularly ambitious application is Gilpin's analysis of war and hegemonic 
stability. He argues that the presence of a hegemonic power is central to the preservation 
of stability and peace in the international system. Much of Gilpin's argument resembles 
his own and Krasner's earlier thesis that hegemonic states provide an international order 
that furthers their own self-interest. Gilpin now elaborates the thesis with the claim that 
international order is a public good, benefiting subordinate states. This is, of course, the 
essence of the theory of hegemonic stability. But Gilpin adds a novel twist: the dominant 
power not only provides the good, it is capable of extracting contributions toward the 
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good from subordinate states. In effect, the hegemonic power constitutes a quasi-
government by providing public goods and taxing other states to pay for them. 
Subordinate states will be reluctant to be taxed but, because of the hegemonic state's 
preponderant power, will succumb. Indeed, if they receive net benefits (i.e., a surplus of 
public good benefits over the contribution extracted from them), they may recognize 
hegemonic leadership as legitimate and so reinforce its performance and position. 
During the 19th century several countries benefited from British hegemony particularly its 
rule of the seas, since WWII the U.S. has also provided a similar stability and security 
that as made smaller powers thrive in the international system.  The model presumes that 
the (military) dominance of the hegemonic state, which gives it the capacity to enforce an 
international order, also gives it an interest in providing a generally beneficial order so as 
to lower the costs of maintaining that order and perhaps to facilitate its ability to extract 
contributions from other members of the system.61
The economic regime that is best characterized by American Hegemony is the 
Bretton Woods Agreement; the term "Bretton Woods system" incorporates WTO as well 
as the IMF and World Bank, because the Bretton Woods Conference looked forward to 
the creation of an ancillary institution that would reduce obstacles to international trade 
and give effect to the principle of multilateral nondiscriminatory trade. Although the 
initial plans for the Havana Charter and the creation of an International Trade 
Organization were not carried out, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
(which later led to the WTO) emerged as a multilateral agreement embodying 
commercial policy provisions essentially similar to the Havana Charter chapter on 
commercial policy. While the IMF was intended to repair the disintegration that had 
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befallen the international monetary system prior to the War, and the World Bank was 
designed to stimulate and support foreign investment, which had declined to insignificant 
amounts, the WTO was intended to reverse the protectionist and discriminatory trade 
practices that had multiplied during the prewar depression years. The Fund and WTO 
were to collaborate on exchange policies and trade policies.' In combination, the Fund, 
the Bank, and WTO were designed to help the advanced industrial countries achieve the 
multiple objectives of full employment, freer and expanding trade, and stable exchange 
rates.62 The glue that made the post WWII economic environment prosperous for the 
allies and paved the way for continual U.S. dominance was the Bretton Woods 
Agreement.
The Bretton Woods Agreement is the result of a long process of negotiation 
between the British and U.S. experts; subsequently adhered to by the delegates of forty-
four countries at Bretton Woods. The gist of the agreement is that if this country will 
create and maintain the conditions necessary for multilateral trade in a reasonably free 
exchange market, England will undertake, after a transition period of three to five years 
during which exchange control and bilateral currency arrangements are permitted, to 
relinquish her controls and join a multilateral exchange system. The agreement, however, 
carefully states that, even after the five-year period, the member country itself shall be the 
judge of whether the conditions are right for relaxing its controls. In weighing the 
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adoption of the Fund, the essential question is whether there is a fair prospect that this 
bargain can be consummated.63   
These institutions were to coordinate exchange rates, control the world economy, 
insure free and fair trade, in order to avoid the pre war protectionist regimes and basically 
rebuild its member’s economies.  The alliances of the United States with Japan and with 
the Western European countries in NATO rested on three fundamentals: shared political 
and economic values; common economic interests; and the Soviet security threat. 
Without the last of these three, the alliances would never have come into existence. Now, 
however, the Soviet threat is gone, and common economic interests are giving way to 
competing economic interests. Shared political and economic values remain the
principal glue holding together the grand alliances of the Cold War. Those common 
values are real, and they mean that wars are most unlikely between these countries.64
The pillars that will maintain U.S. hegemony are the countries that have most to 
gain from it Japan and Germany.  These two countries were the defeated powers in WWII 
and the two powers that benefitted the most by the benevolent nature of U.S. hegemony. 
The anticipated decline of American power into the late 1970s and the seeming inability 
of Germany and Japan to adopt a political profile commensurate with their perceived 
economic power generated the conventional belief that Germany emerged from the defeat 
of the Second World War as one of the world's two 'zaghafte Riesen' or timorous giants -
a sentiment captured by the description of Germany as an economic giant, but political 
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dwarf.65  In two attempts to gain hegemonic status Germany failed. Under the US 
security umbrella the German export driven economy has surged and through intuitions 
like NATO and the EU, the security dilemma it caused for its neighbors in the past has 
been mitigated.  A weak German economy would have been a liability for the Western 
alliance, undermining political stability and opening up opportunities for Soviet 
maneuvers. Because of the integrative features of the Western alliance, the faltering 
economy of one partner in the alliance would have weakened all, with negative 
consequences also for military preparedness. The tensions of the Cold War created an 
atmosphere in the West that was generally in sympathy with German aspirations to 
restore a viable economy. Economic recovery was skillfully complemented and 
underpinned by Bonn's policy on political recovery, and by extension its policy on 
security and rearmament, on which the whole construct rested. In such mixed political 
and economic ventures as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later the 
European Economic Community (EEC), political and economic gains went hand in hand 
and were achieved through a coordinated strategy that advanced German demands in the 
name of European and Atlantic unity rather than of a discredited German nationalism. 
The restraint of Germany through international organizations and treaties was at the core 
of Washington's postwar European policy of double containment: the containment of the 
Soviet Union at arm's length and of Germany with an embrace. 
Every major event in the postwar history of Europe follows from this: the 
rearmament and economic reconstruction of the Federal Republic within the restraints of 
international organizations, the development of NATO from a loosely organized mutual 
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assistance pact into an integrated military alliance, American support for Western 
European integration, and the solidification of Europe.66
The post WWII reconstruction of Germany was so thorough and far sighted that it 
was able to turn a recent enemy to a strong ally:  Germany's freedom of movement has 
been limited by domestic institutional constraints overlain by a dense network of external 
institutional constraints on autonomous decision making in the domains of security and 
economy.67 Thus a powerful combination of constitutional design, membership in 
integrative international institutions as allowed Germany to achieve the post-war 
American objective of 'security for Germany and security from Germany'.  Germany's 
macroeconomic role in Europe has been classified as ranging from simple predominance 
to asymmetry to dominance. German predominance is supported by some empirical 
studies, yet German power in this domain is dependent upon the level of German 
independence from the structure of global (read U.S.) interest. German monetary 
autonomy and power in Europe has depended upon a stable and benign U.S. macro 
economy. Without that external environment made by U.S. hegemonic stability the 
German juggernaut could be revisionist.  One consequence of the German violation of the 
laws of warfare was the multilateralization and institutionalization of German power -
Germany was largely constrained over the course of the post-war period from 
undertaking unilateral foreign policy initiatives, with the notable exception of the 
Ostpolitik. German foreign policy was (and remains) constrained and constituted by its 
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membership in and formal surveillance by integrative institutions like NATO, the 
Western European Union (WEU), and the EU.68
By restructuring Germany after the war and providing markets for German goods 
the US was finally able to assuage German aggression. Within the confines of the 
American security umbrella, the Germans achieved security, sovereignty, prosperity, 
and a stable democratic political order.69   U.S. hegemonic stability offered free markets 
and a security that enabled Germany to prosper without resorting to war and aggression.  
Since 1871 Germany as been looking for security; it was only after WWII that it has 
found a rightful place within the hierarchy of nations, and that is only due to US 
hegemonic stability. As the relative power of the US declines Germany will contribute 
more resources to maintain the status quo and continue to prop up the American 
hegemon. Japan will continue its partnership with the US hegemon for economic and 
strategic reasons.  The nature of the Japanese economy; with its high ratio of trade to 
GNP the economy remains, and will continue to remain, highly vulnerable to the cutting 
of its sea lines of communication of the sort so effectively imposed by the Americans 
during the Second World War. Additionally, and this was not the case in 1930; Japan is 
now a major player in the liberal international economic order. Its prosperity and its 
economic security are deeply and increasingly entangled in a global web of financial, 
production and trading interdependence. In this respect Japan is almost a demonstration 
case for those who argue that economic interdependence raises the costs and reduces the 
incentives of the resort to force. The incentives for war are reduced not only because of 
the cost of disrupting vital economic relations, but also because the very existence of 
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complex interdependence offers states a whole range of more efficient and finely tuned 
instruments for influencing each other's behavior. Strategically: The outcome of the 
Second World War in the Pacific was definitive for Japan. The window of relative 
military advantage and therefore of opportunity that opened for it between 1895 and 1945 
has closed forever. East Asia is no longer composed of vulnerable European colonies and 
the decaying remains of an old Chinese empire. Japan can never again dominate the 
region militarily, and even its most enthusiastic re-armers could only hope to make it one 
of the four military great powers permanently engaged in the region. One can conclude 
that a revival of militarism in Japan is highly unlikely, and that if it did occur there would 
be no opportunities for its expression comparable to those of the 1930s and 1940s. The 
economy is the foundation of a state's security and prosperity. As its economic power 
increases, so does the range and variety of its national interest, the more so for a country 
like Japan whose economy depends on a high turnover of imports and exports. In Japan's 
case, the sheer size of the economy, the second largest after the U.S., means that its trade, 
investment and financial interests are widely spread throughout the international system. 
Since the smooth running of the world economy ultimately depends on political order i.e. 
U.S. hegemonic stability, Japan's national interest is automatically entangled in the major 
questions of world politics, both East-West and North-South, by its economic 
involvement in them.  The risk to Japan that a weakly led international economy could 
slide towards competitive protectionism is much too great for it to contemplate with 
complacency. During the 1930s and 1940s Japan learned the hard way that it had no 
workable solutions to the problem of maintaining its own security and prosperity in a 
neo-mercantilist international environment. No country of Japan's weight has ever 
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escaped this basic security logic of life in the international anarchy, that great powers are 
driven by self-interest to assert themselves politically in the international system in 
proportion to the extent of their global engagements. Japan cannot live in the shadow of 
the Second World War forever. Eventually it will have to decide what sort of role it 
wants to play in the new international era that is replacing the old postwar order.  That 
role will be a continual partnership with the US to continue the public goods that it has 
received since the end of WWII.  Any change in the status quo, multi-polar world where 
the U.S. is a minor power would be disastrous for Japan.70  Japan and Germany will 
continue to support its U.S. ally and continue to pay the cost that will ensure U.S.
dominance and leadership in the World. 
                                                
70 Buzan,Barry, ‘Japan's Future: Old History versus New Roles’, in  International Affairs (Vol. 64, No. 4.,
(Autumn,1988), p. 561.
61
Chapter IV: The Institutional Nature of U.S. Hegemony: Post 9/11 the 
Failure of Unilateralism
62
The Institutional Nature of U.S. Hegemony: Post 9/11 the Failure of 
Unilateralism
The well-documented invasion of Iraq, and the Bush Doctrine marked a 
significant change in U.S. foreign policy; U.S. foreign policy seemed bent on going 
against the will of its allies, France and Germany, and unilaterally invading countries.  A 
unilateral America is a transitory phenomenon; the acts of September 11, 2001 were so 
heinous that a majority of the foreign policy decision makers were willing to condone 
unilateralism.  But after seven years of unilateralism the Bush regime has realized its 
error and reverted back to multilateralism.  Allies have been consulted on a regular basis;
international organizations have been approached in order so solve conflicts ranging from 
Somalia, Iraq, and Georgia; such as the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), World Bank, and European Union.
NATO enlargement represents the best case of continual U.S. multilateralism.  
After 9/11 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania have 
entered NATO.  Croatia and Albania are scheduled to join in 2009.  Although essentially 
a military alliance; NATO membership offers humanitarian aid, conflict resolution 
mechanisms, and economic aid.  Since NATO is viewed as the catalyst that rebuilt 
Western Europe.  The new members feel that it will do the same for the Eastern European 
countries that are now entering by providing security guarantees against a revisionist 
Russia and much needed development aid and access to Western European and American 
markets and grants.  President Clinton was the first to voice this opinion: that NATO and 
not European institutions like the European Union and EEC had turned Western Europe 
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into “a source of stability instead of hostility,” and that NATO expansion could do for 
Europe’s East what it did for Europe’s West: Prevent a return to local rivalries.  In other 
words, stability requires a hegemon, which is why “America remains the indispensable 
nation” and why U.S. policy is driven to extend the frontiers of stability, so that “a gray 
zone of insecurity [does] not reemerge in Europe”71
Perhaps the most recent example of the failure of Unilateralism and the return to 
multilateralism by the United States is the handling of the Somali security crisis.  
Alarmed at the Islamic Court’s growing strength and popularity, in early 2006 the CIA 
began supplying significant quantities of arms and money to a coalition of secular
Mogadishu warlords under the name Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter 
Terrorism (ARPCT).  The CIA program had been a poorly conceived attempt to hunt 
down the small number of al-Qaeda affiliated individuals involved in the 1998 bombings 
of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, then thought to be hiding in Somalia.  But 
the operation failed disastrously and, according to reports, ‘the payoffs added to an 
anarchic situation that led many Somalis to turn to the Islamic Courts for protection’.72
After building a critical mass and routing the ARPCT the Islamic Courts gained 
control of South Central Somalia.  The Americans and Ethiopians were horrified and 
once again opted for the military option and invaded Somalia unilaterally; in the Horn of 
Africa Ethiopia is the regional hegemon.  The Americans felt the Union of Islamic Courts
(UIC) were hosting al-Qaeda, and the Ethiopians were fearful of the UIC because of their 
revisionist claims and support for the Ogaden rebel movement.  However, the Islamic 
militia stayed clear of areas close to the Ethiopian border, which had become a place of 
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refuge for many Somalis including the Transitional Federal Government itself, 
headquartered in the town of Baidoa.  Ethiopia said it would protect Baidoa if threatened.  
On September 25, 2006, the ICU moved into the southern port of Kismaayo, the last 
remaining port held by the transitional government.  Ethiopian troops entered Somalia 
and seized the town of Buur Hakaba on 9 October 2006, and later that day the UIC issued 
a declaration of war against Ethiopia.73  
On 1 November 2006, peace talks between the transitional Government and the 
ICU broke down.  The international community feared an all-out war, with Ethiopian and 
rival Eritrean forces backing opposing sides in the power-struggle.  Fighting erupted once 
again on 21 December 2006 when the leader of UIC, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys said: 
“Somalia is in a state of war, and all Somalis should take part in this struggle against 
Ethiopia”, and heavy fighting broke out between the Islamic militia on one side and the 
Somali Transitional Government allied with Ethiopian forces on the other.  In late 
December 2006, Ethiopia launched air strikes against Islamic troops and strong points 
across Somalia.  Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi then announced that his country 
was waging a war against the UIC to protect his country’s sovereignty.  “Ethiopian 
Defense Forces were forced to enter into war to protect the sovereignty of the nation and 
to blunt repeated attacks of Islamic Courts terrorist and anti-Ethiopian elements they are 
supporting,”74  
In 2006 it was felt that the best way to stop the ICU was by a unilateral military 
intervention, so the Bush administration gave the green light to Ethiopia to restore the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to Mogadishu.  After two years of occupying 
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Somalia Ethiopian forces are withdrawing back to Ethiopia, the TFG is widely unpopular 
and lacks legitimacy, the moderate UIC has been replaced by the more extremist al-
Shabaab that has regained all the territory that it lost when Ethiopia invaded.  The 
invasion was supposed to restore peace and provide for a more stable Somalia the 
opposite has happened and the once moderate UIC has been replaced by a revisionist and 
extremist al-Shabaab.  The primary aim of the U.S.-backed Ethiopian invasion that 
installed President Yusuf and the internationally recognized transitional federal 
government was to dislodge a relatively diverse Islamist movement that had taken over 
Mogadishu.  But two years later, the most radical wing of the ousted Islamist movement 
has emerged stronger, more battle-hardened and better-financed than ever.75
Seeing the error in their ways both the U.S. and Ethiopia are seeking multilateral 
ways of resolving the crisis.  The African Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), and the United Nations have been approached to help resolve the 
crisis.  At the International Contact Group on Somalia meeting Secretary of State Rice 
stated that Somalia continues to face enormous challenges despite the political process 
represented by the Djibouti Agreement; despite progress, security remains tenuous and 
requires immediate action. U.S. views the deployment of a United Nation peacekeeping 
operation as vital.  The international community must support a resolution that will re hat 
the current A.U. Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) which will allow for a coordinated 
withdrawal of Ethiopian forces.  AMISOM is unable to sustain themselves in the current 
circumstances.  With a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation the chances for the 
Djibouti peace process to succeed are greater.  A multilateral effort is what is needed now 
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to save Somalia from the current turmoil.76  Since making these comments on the 16 
December 2008, the U.S. has been busy engaging allies, the United Nations, IGAD, and 
the African Union, to help support their efforts on resolving the conflict in Somalia.  The 
failure of the unilateral approach has seen the restoration of multilateralism in solving 
global conflict.
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Chapter V:  Conclusion
68
Conclusion:
The maintenance of U.S. primacy matters for the world as well as for the United 
States. First, no other country can make comparable contributions to international order 
and stability. The security consequences of a multi-polar world have been dramatically 
evident in the dismal failure of the major European powers to deal with the Yugoslav 
catastrophe on their doorstep. Leaders and publics throughout the world recognize the 
need for an American presence and American leadership in maintaining stability in their 
region.  These are, as the prime ministers of Japan and Korea said, "Indispensable" to 
Asian security and world security.77
The fear is, instead, that Americans may well turn isolationist again and do 
exactly that. The ability of the United States to provide international order is obviously 
limited and, despite the constant demands, the United States cannot settle every dispute in 
every part of the world. Yet the fact remains that, as General Colin Powell, former
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, put it, one of the fondest expressions around here is 
that we can't be the world's policeman. But guess who gets called when suddenly 
someone needs a cop.   As Bosnia, Somalia, and many other places evidence, the answer 
to that question is obvious. And, given the nature of the world as it is, is there any 
remotely plausible alternative answer or better answer? If the United States is unable to 
maintain security in the world's trouble spots, no other single country or combination of 
countries is likely to provide a substitute.  A world without U.S. primacy will be a world 
with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world 
where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country in 
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shaping global affairs. The sustained international primacy of the United States is central 
to the welfare and security of Americans and to the future of freedom, democracy, open 
economies, and international order in the world.78  Since the end of WWII the U.S. has 
build an international system that rest on liberal institutions and regimes.  With its 
predominant position the U.S. as sought to achieve a benevolent hegemony in partnership 
with its European allies and Japan.  As U.S. hegemony wanes countries like Japan and 
Germany will do all that is possible to continue the status quo.  They will work hard to tie 
in rising powers like India and China in to the current liberal institutional framework. The 
rising emerging powers will be tolerant of the U.S. because of its benevolent hegemony 
and its 'special' qualities-its provision of global public goods, its exercise of power 
through rules and institutions, and the allowance for weaker states to have 'voice 
opportunities’79  This specialness of U.S. benevolent hegemony I feel is the main catalyst 
that will perpetuate it, there will not be a hegemonic war like the one that ended the 
British hegemony.  There will be a gradual reliance on allies such as Japan and Germany 
that will be the main supporters of continued U.S. hegemony.
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